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SUMMARY
On  1st  October  2006,  the  Employment  Equality  (Age)  Regulations  2006   come   into   force.
Expectations  of  older  workers  will  be  dampened  however  with  the  inclusion  of  a   “default
retirement age”, entitling employers to retire workers aged  65  or  over,  without  justification.   A
major  reason  given  for  this  exemption  is  to  preserve  the  stability  of   occupational   pension
schemes. In Canada, a challenge to a similar retirement exemption  failed  in  the  Supreme  Court.
The reason was based,  in part, on the need to preserve the stability of pensions. This paper argues
that the Canadian experience can be distinguished and that  default  retirement  age  in  the  British
legislation is questionable under European law and is  not  necessary  to  preserve  the  stability  of
pension schemes.
1. INTRODUCTION
The   “Framework”   Directive’s   2000/78/EC   prohibition   of   age   discrimination   had   to   be
implemented by October 2006. The consequent Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (SI
2006/1031)  allow  employers  to  retire  workers  in  two  different  circumstances.  First,  with   a
“default” retirement age of 65 which will  enable employers to dismiss workers reaching  that  age
on the ground of retirement, without objective  justification.  Second,  employers  will  be  able  to
retire their  workers  at  any  age,  provided  they  can  objectively  justify  such  a  policy.  Should
employers agree to keep on a worker beyond 65, the general principle  against  age  discrimination
will apply, save, of course, to cases of retirement.
The Government stated that a major reason why employers will wish to take advantage of the  default  retirement  age
would be to preserve the “stability” of their  occupational  pension  plans.  Of  course,  employers  may
have this in mind when justifying an earlier retirement age.
The aim of this paper is first, to question the legitimacy under the Directive of  a  default  retirement  age.  Second,  to
explore whether a  default  retirement  age  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  “stability”  of  occupational
pension plans. A similar issue has arisen in the Canadian Supreme Court, and  its  experience  will
be used in  the  analysis.  Third,  to  explore  the  legal  possibilities  of  defending  an  employer’s
mandatory retirement age below 65 against  a  claim  of  age  discrimination,  where  the  principal
reason for the retirement is to protect an occupational pension scheme.
2. THE EU LEGISLATION
The starting point is the main text of the Framework Directive:
“Article 2
Concept of discrimination
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the “principle of equal treatment” shall mean that there shall
be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever  on  any  of  the  grounds  referred  to  in
Article 1.”
Article 1 refers to religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation as the  grounds  covered  by  the  Directive.
The precise definitions of discrimination follow the models developed by the ECJ and  used  in  the  Equal  Treatment
(sex) Directive 76/207 and Race Directive 2000/43. Thus the Directive carries standard  definitions
of direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation. Article 4(1) provides  the  now
standard  exception  for  “genuine  and  determining   occupational   requirements”   with   can   be
justified. The Directive  departs  from  the  norm  with  an  extra  derogation  specifically  for  age.
Article 6(1) provides:
“... Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds  of  age  shall  not
constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national  law,  they  are  objectively  and
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including  legitimate  employment  policy,  labour
market and vocational training  objectives,  and  if  the  means  of  achieving  that  aim  are
appropriate and necessary.”
Three examples are provided by a non-exhaustive list: “(a) the setting of special conditions  on  access
to employment and  vocational  training,  employment  and  occupation,  including  dismissal  and
remuneration conditions, for young people, older workers and persons with caring  responsibilities
in order  to  promote  their  vocational  integration  or  ensure  their  protection;  (b)  the  fixing  of
minimum  conditions  of  age,  professional  experience  or  seniority   in   service   for   access   to
employment or to certain advantages linked to employment; (c) the fixing of a  maximum  age  for
recruitment which is based on the training requirements of the post in question or  the  need  for  a
reasonable period of employment before retirement.”
Article 6(2) provides that an occupational pension scheme, in itself, may discriminate on  grounds
of age:
“ ... Member States may provide that the fixing for occupational social security schemes of
ages for admission or entitlement to retirement or invalidity benefits,  including  the  fixing
under those schemes of different ages for employees or groups or categories of employees,
and the use, in the context of such schemes, of age criteria  in  actuarial  calculations,  does
not constitute  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  age,  provided  this  does  not  result  in
discrimination on the grounds of sex.”
What is notable about this exception, is that discrimination need not be justified.  Occupational  pension  schemes  are
ring-fenced from the Directive. However,  Article  (2)  does  not  legitimise  dismissal,  or  retirement  per  se,
although of course, an age-discriminatory pension scheme may form the background to  justifying
a dismissal. Finally, Recital 14 of the preamble, states: “This Directive shall be  without  prejudice
to national provisions laying down retirement ages.”
3. DEFAULT RETIREMENT AGE
On 14 December 2004, the Government announced that it  will  introduce  a  “default”  retirement
age of 65, enabling employers to dismiss workers reaching that age on  the  ground  of  retirement,
without objective justification. This was qualified with  an  aspiration  to  abolish  the  default  age
after 5 years:
“Ultimately we look forward to a future where people have complete choice about when to
stop working, and retirement ages become a thing of the past. If the  formal  review  of  the
legislation suggests that we should abolish compulsory retirement ages, then  that  is  what
we will do.”
(Written statement to Parliament, House of Commons Hansard Written Ministerial Statements  for
14 Dec 2004 (pt 4), Columns 127WS-130WS; or Lords Hansard Text for 14  Dec  2004  (241214-
41), Colums WS78-WS81. See also, ‘Equality and diversity: coming of age.  Consultation  on  the
draft Employment Equality (Age) Regulations  2006’  (July  2005)  DTI,  URN  05/1171,  at  para
6.1.24.)
Regulation  30  provides  the  exception  for  retirement,  whilst  Schedule  6  provides  a  “right  to  request”  deferred
retirement procedure  and  Schedule  8  adds  sections  98ZA  to  98ZH  to  the  Employment  Rights  Act  1996,  with
provisions necessary to protect employers from unfair dismissal claims in cases of retirement.
Should employers agree to  keep  on  a  worker  beyond  65,  save  for  retirement,  the  general  principle  against  age
discrimination will apply. So, for instance, discriminatory discipline, pay,  harassment,  and  job  classification  would
remain unlawful.
This arrangement  has  necessitated  some  delicate  and  convoluted  drafting  to  avoid  two  clashes  with  the  parent
Directive. First, it must not breach the Directive’s non-regression principle. Second, the Directive does  not  appear  to
grant Member States a blanket derogation, and so it will have to be justified under Article 6(1).
A. Non-regression and Unfair Dismissal
Any Government  measure  may  be  attacked  under  the  non-regression  principle,  expressed  in
Article 8, if the Directive is used to reduce protection against discrimination. The obvious  area  of
concern  here  is  the  existing  age  restrictions  to  unfair  dismissal  rights,  where   section   109,
Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) excludes from  claiming  unfair  dismissal,  those  over
the employer’s “normal retiring age”, or in the absence of that, 65. This has allowed, for  instance,
police officers and teachers to negotiate for retirement well below 65, which is  normally  coupled
with an occupational pension. Where the normal retiring age is above  65,  unfair  dismissal  rights
will apply right up to that normal retiring age; the “default” age in section 109 ERA 1996 does not
prevail over the normal retiring age  (Nothman  v  Barnett  LBC    [1979]  ICR  111,  HL,  at  116.)
Where the employer’s normal retiring age is a sham, the statutory age of 65 will apply.  (Whittle  v
MSC [1987] IRLR 441 EAT, where 90% stayed beyond the contract retiring age  of  60.  See  also
May v Harrison (2003) UKEAT/0128/03/ZT, EAT.)
Beyond that, the law becomes complex. The “normal retiring age” is not found by a strict contractual test, but  by  the
“reasonable understanding or expectation of the employees  holding  that  position  at  the  relevant  time.”  (Waite  v
GCHQ [1983] ICR 653 HL, per  Lord  Fraser,  at  662-663.)  Thus  it  is  possible  for  a  worker’s
contractual retiring age to differ from his normal retirement  age.  (Although  the  normal  retiring
age cannot be lower than the contractual retiring age: Bratko v Beloit Walmsley Ltd  [1995]  IRLR
629 EAT.) Difficulties arise when an employer tries to change the normal retiring age. Of  course,
there is no  problem  where  the  change  is  agreed.  Further,  the  courts  will  allow  an  employer
unilaterally to change the normal retiring age, so  long  as  this  does  not  amount  to  a  breach  of
contract  (Waite  v  GCHQ  [1983]  ICR  653  HL).  This  is  possible   where,   for   instance,   the
contractual retirement age is 60, but  in  practice  the  employer  retires  its  staff  at  65.  Here  the
employer is free to reduce its  workers’  normal  retiring  age  (and  with  it  their  unfair  dismissal
rights) to as low as the contractual one of 60 (Brooks v BT [1992] ICR  414  CA,  at  pars  35  and
45).
So an agreement to reduce the normal retiring age (be it  contractual  or  not)  from,  say,  70  to  the
default age of 65, will not reduce workers’ age discrimination rights to below  that  which  existed
before the Directive. A similar reduction imposed  by  the  employer,  which  is  not  in  breach  of
contract, similarly will  not  reduce  its  workers’  rights.  However,  as  the  law  stood  before  the
Directive, an employer cannot impose a  reduction  which  amounts  to  a  breach  of  contract,  for
example, where the normal and contractual retirement age is 70, and  the  employer  reduces  it  to
65. In such a case, the workers’ unfair dismissal rights remain up to the age of 70 (Bratko v  Beloit
Walmsley Ltd [1995] IRLR 629 EAT.)
Therefore the Directive does not permit the Government to legislate for a default retirement age that authorises
employers unilaterally to reduce their normal retiring age where this is in breach of  contract.  The
default retirement age then becomes confined to  those  employers  who  had  never  set  a  normal
retiring age, but in practice dismiss those aged 65, as permitted by the  unfair  dismissal  “default”
age in section 109, ERA 1996. The major impact will be  on  those  approaching  65,  who  held  a
reasonable expectation that the Directive would give them the right to carry on working. This  was
encouraged, not least, by the Government’s previous announcement of a default retirement age  of
70 (Equality and Diversity: Age Matters (2003), DTI/Pub 6559/10k/06/03/NP. URN 03/20,  2003;
pp 20, 25 para 4.25, 32 para 5.8).
Schedule 8, paragraph 23 amends the Employment Rights Act by inserting sections 98ZA-98ZH, which exclude from
the unfair dismissal provisions a variety  of  retirement  scenarios.  First,  where  the  is  no  normal  retirement  age,  a
worker cannot be retired before aged 65 (s 98ZA), but can be afterwards (s 98ZB). Second, where  there  is  a  normal
retirement age,  a worker cannot be retired before  that  normal  retirement  age  (s  98ZC),  but  can  be  afterwards  (s
98ZD). Where the normal retirement age is below 65, section 98ZE(2) cryptically provides that  “If  it  is  unlawful
discrimination under the 2006 Regulations for the employee to have  that  normal  retirement  age,
retirement of the employee  shall  not  be  taken  to  be  the  reason  (or  a  reason)  for  dismissal.”
Presumably this alludes to the scenario where the employer cannot objectively  justify  its  normal
retirement age, which, being under 65, is prima facie direct age discrimination. Where the  normal
retirement age is lawful (it has been justified), then a worker may be retired accordingly. For these
exclusions to apply, the employer must have followed the procedures  (notification,  consideration
of the request not to retire, and subsequent appeal) set out in Schedule 6 of  the  2006  Regulations
(see below).
It appears from this that an employer can unilaterally move its normal retirement age as before.  The  legislation  does
not expressly state whether this cannot be done below any contractual retirement age but in the absence of an  express
provision, and bearing in mind that such a provision would breach the non-regression principle, the presumption must
be that the common law position persists.
B. Blanket Derogation and Recital 14
Such a broad exception appears to fall short of a proper implementation of the Directive. The only
part of the Directive that supports a blanket derogation is Recital 14 of the preamble.  However,  if
this recital does not validate the default retirement age, the Government would be bound to justify
it under Article 6(1). So, much turns on the precise meaning of Recital 14.
The history of the legislation is inconclusive on this matter. It shows that the UK Government  pressed  for  age  to  be
given a unique status in discrimination law, by proposing the following recital regarding derogation:
 “Age has a special status in that certain  differences  of  treatment  on  age  in  employment
practices are legitimate; such differences may vary across Member  States  in  the  light  of
their  constitutions,  traditions  and  practices  and  their  labour  market  conditions;  it  is
therefore essential to distinguish between legitimate differences and discrimination  which
must be prohibited.”
(Proposal for  a  Council  Directive  establishing  the  general  framework  for  equal  treatment  in
employment and occupation - political agreement, 12270/00 ADD 1 (12 October 2000).)
Accordingly, the UK proposed a new Article 6(1): “Member States shall define  those  differences
of treatment which constitute discrimination for the purposes of Article 2.” (Ibid) Although  a  list
of some “differences in particular”[i] was proposed in a new  Article  6(2),  Article  6(1)  provided
essentially an unlimited exception, without justification, which  could  include  a  national  default
age.
These proposals were rejected. The final version contained a conventional definition of discrimination for age (Article
2), with  the  ordinary  exception  for  determining  occupational  requirements  (Article  4(1)),  and  the  extraordinary
Recital 14 and Article 6. This suggests, on the one hand, the UK intended a default retirement age  to  be  permissible,
whilst the other States did not.  It  also  suggests,  albeit  less  convincingly,  that  the  rejection  of  the  UK’s  original
proposals, and the acceptance of Recital 14,  amounted  to  a  compromise,  by  which  all  exceptions,  bar  a  national
retiring age (and pension scheme ages), had to be justified.  But  it  remains  odd  why  the  retirement  exception  was
isolated in the preamble. Thus, the history sheds little light on the true meaning of the recital.
So we turn to a reading of the face of the Directive. The most obvious problem is  that  Recital  14  conflicts  with  the
fundamental principle of equal treatment stated in Article 2(1),  which  states  that  there  “shall  be  no  discrimination
whatsoever”  on  the  grounds  set  out.  (Emphasis  supplied.  The  phrase   is   used   in   the   Equal
Treatment Directive (Art 2(1)), but oddly, “whatsoever” does  not  appear  in  the  Race  Directive
2000/43, the Equal Pay Directive 75/117,  nor  Articles  39  (nationality)  or  141  (equal  pay)  EC
Treaty.) Further, if the recital were read as a free-standing exception, ECJ  jurisprudence  suggests
that such exceptions must be “interpreted strictly”, “in view of the fundamental importance of  the
principle of equal treatment.” (Marshall v Southampton and SW Hants AHA Case  C-152/84  ECJ,
[1986] IRLR 140, at 148.) A strict  interpretation  is  unlikely  to  yield  a  blanket  omission  from
protection of a large class of people who are the most vulnerable to age discrimination. A  reading
of some other recitals helps a little. Recital (4) reminds us that the right  against  discrimination  is
“universal”, suggesting a group (ie those over a certain arbitrary age) should not be excluded from
the protection of the Directive. Recital (11) states that discrimination on any of grounds  protected
“may undermine ... the objectives of the EC Treaty”. Recital (7) states  that  one  objective  of  the
EC Treaty is to achieve “coordination between employment  policies  of  Member  States”,  whilst
Recital (8) stresses “the  need  to  pay  particular  attention  to  supporting  older  workers”  with  a
“coherent set of policies”. These suggest  that  Recital  14  should  not  give  excessive  latitude  to
Member States.
Meanwhile, other exclusions mentioned in the preamble have corresponding paragraphs/provisions in the main  body.
So Recitals 12 (nationality), 13 (state social security schemes), and 19 (disability and age in the  armed  forces),  serve
to amplify the exclusions allowed by, Article 3, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, respectively. There is  no  such  corresponding
Article (suggesting a default retirement age) to Recital 14. If anything, Recital 14 appears  to  amplify  Article  3(3),
which relates to state social security schemes, which of course, may  have  retirement  age  factors
built in. (Although it must be noted that Article 3(1) seems to be amplified adequately  by  Recital
13.) Further, there are  two  specific  age-discrimination  exceptions  contained  in  the  main  text,
provided by Article 6. It would be anomalous to put a third exception in preamble. All  this  points
to the Recital having little meaning, and certainly not one allowing a blanket retiring age.
The deciding factor must be that if Recital 14  were  read  to  permit  a  blanket  default  retirement  age,  it  would  be
incompatible with the substantive text of the Directive,  especially  the  fundamental  principle  of  equal  treatment  in
Article 2. In which case, the rule is “... the preamble to a Community act has  no  binding  legal  force  and  cannot  be
relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual  provisions  of  the  act  in  question.”  (Gunnar  Nilsson,  Per
Olov Hagelgren and Solweig Arrborn Case C-162/97, 1998 ECR I-7477, ECJ, at para 54. See also
Opinion of A-G Tizzano in R v Sec of State for Trade and Industry ex  p  BECTU  C  Case-173/99
[2001] ECR I-4881, at para 39.) Accordingly,  the  Government  could  not  argue  that  is  free  to
legislate for a default retirement age. Such legislation can only be made under Article 6(1), and  so
must be objectively justified.
C. Objective Justification
If the Recital cannot be used for a default age,  the  Government  would  be  bound  to  justify  any
default age as being in pursuit of a legitimate aim, appropriate and necessary, in  accordance  with
Article 6(1) of the Directive. The Government stated that a major reason why employers will wish
to take advantage  of  the  default  retirement  age  would  be  to  preserve  the  “stability”  of  their
occupational pension plans.  In  addition,  the  impact  of  the  exception  may  be  softened  by  an
employer’s “duty-to-consider” a request for deferred  retirement.  This  needs  to  be  explored,  to
establish more precisely the impact of the exception, before  considering  the  “pensions  stability”
claim.
Part of an argument to justify the default retiring age would  be  that  its  indiscriminate  effect  is  softened  by  giving
employees a “right to request” deferred retirement, apparently along similar lines to right of parents of young children
to request flexible  working.  (Written  statement  to  Parliament,  House  of  Commons  Hansard  Written  Ministerial
Statements for 14 Dec 2004 (pt 4), Columns 127WS-130WS; or Lords Hansard Text for  14  Dec  2004  (241214-41),
Colums WS78-WS81.)
Section 80F, ERA 1996, gives an eligible employee a right to request flexible working.  The  employer  may  refuse  a
request  if  “he  considers”  one  or  more  of  specified  grounds  applies.  These  grounds  are:  (i)  the  burden  of
additional costs, (ii) detrimental effect on ability to meet  customer  demand,  (iii)  inability  to  re-
organise work among existing staff, (iv) inability to recruit additional staff, (v) detrimental impact
on quality, (vi) detrimental impact on performance, (vii) insufficiency of work during  the  periods
the employee proposes to work, (viii) planned structural  changes.  (ERA  1996,  s  80G  (b)).  The
employer also  must  provide  an  explanation  (SI  2002/3207,  Reg  5(b)(2)).  An  employee  may
complain to an employment tribunal only if the decision is based on “incorrect facts” (ERA  1996,
s 80H (1)(b)) or the employer has not followed the prescribed procedure (ERA 1996, s 80H (1)(b),
and SI 2002/3236). The subjective element “he considers” means the employee  cannot  challenge
the business ground(s) given by the employer. The remedy is compensation capped to a maximum
of eight weeks’ pay, with a week’s pay itself capped at  £290.  (Employment  Rights  (Increase  of
Limits) Order 2005, SI 2005/3352, Sch, Article 3, in force 1 Feb 2006. It is set by the Secretary of
State each year according with retail prices.)
Schedule 6, paragraph 2, of the  Age  Regulations  provides  that  the  employer  must  give  notice  in  writing  of  the
employee’s right to make a request and the date on  which  it  intends  the  employee  to  retire,  not
more than one year and not less than six months before that date.  Paragraphs 3 to  9  provide  ,  in
essence, following an employee’s request, the employer should hold with him a meeting (at which
the employee may choose to be accompanied), or at least receive from him representations.  If  the
employer wishes to go ahead with its  decision  to  retire  the  employee,  it  must  confirm  this  in
writing. The employee has a right  to  appeal.  The  remedy  for  dismissal  without  following  the
procedure is unfair dismissal (ERA 1996, s 98ZG.), although this does not apply  if  the  employee
was prevented from being accompanied. (In which case the remedy is a maximum  of  two  weeks
pay, capped at £290 per week: Age Regulations, 2006, Sch  6,  para  12,  and  SI  2005/3352,  Sch,
Article 3, in force 1 Feb 2006.) However, only a failure to comply with the notice procedure  takes
the dismissal out of the retirement exemption, enabling the victim to claim discrimination.
This duty-to-consider deferred retirement is less onerous that the duty  associated  with  the  right  to  request  flexible
working, principally because the employer need not provide a reason for its decision. The Government  hope  that  the
procedure will “promote a culture change ... and move to a position where fixed  retirement  ages  are  relied  on  only
where they can be objectively justified.” (‘Equality and  diversity:  coming  of  age.  Consultation  on  the
draft Employment Equality (Age) Regulations  2006’  (July  2005)  DTI,  URN  05/1171,  at  para
6.3.8.)
Whilst this may result in a reconsideration in a few cases, it is hard to  imagine  it  justifies  the  enormous  amount  of
bureaucracy imposed by the convoluted procedure laid down by Schedule 6, which imposes no duty  of  substance  on
the employer. So long as employers follow the procedure, they may retire its workers at will.
This scheme would have to undergo major changes genuinely to soften the impact of  the  national  default  retirement
age. First, and most obviously, there would need to be different, legitimate, grounds for refusal. In this context, one of
which would have to be the prevention of adverse consequences for  occupational  pension  schemes.  Second,  except
for the notice requirement, the remedy  for  dismissal  without  the  procedure  is  limited  to  unfair  dismissal,  where
compensation is capped at £58,400 (SI 2005/3352, Schedule, in force 1 Feb 2006.)  In  Marshall  v  Southampton
& SW AHA (No 2) Case C-271/91, ECR I-4367, at para 32, the ECJ held that the equivalent Art  6
in  the  Equal   Treatment   Directive   76/207   made   upper   limits   on   compensation   for   sex
discrimination unlawful. Thus this cap is likely to breach Article 9, which requires member  states
to provide a judicial process for victims of discrimination.
To accord with the Directive the proposed “right to request” would have to be broadened so much it would  bear  little
resemblance to its supposed counterpart for flexible working. If it were so broadened, it would put the  employer  in  a
position of having to justify each individual retirement. This then shifts the national default retiring age into the  same
class as any individual employer’s retiring age. In other words, the default  retirement  age  loses  any  distinguishable
meaning. This conclusion means any meaningful “right to request” cannot justify the default retirement age.
4. JUSTIFICATION AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS
The second possible justification, and one put forward by the Government,  relates to the  stability
of occupational pension schemes. In a Written Statement to Parliament, the  Government  justified
the default age because:
“... significant numbers of employers use a set retirement age as a  necessary  part  of  their
workforce planning. While an increasing number of employers ...[have]  no  set  retirement
age for ... their workforce, some nevertheless still rely on it heavily.
Furthermore, ... if all employers only had  the  option  of  individually  justified  retirement
ages at the time the legislation was introduced, this  could  risk  adverse  consequences  for
occupational pension schemes and other  work  related  benefits.  Some  employers  would
instead simply reduce or remove benefits they offer to employees to offset the  increase  in
costs.”
(See note 1. Column 128WS. In its press release  on  the  same  day,  the  Government  stated  that
there was ‘a danger that, without  [a  default  age]  ...   there  could  be  adverse  consequences  for
occupational  pension  schemes  and   other   work-related   benefits.’   DTI   Press   Release   14th
December 2004. See www.dti.gov.uk/pressroom/index.html.  See  also    ‘Equality  and  diversity:
coming of age. Consultation on the  draft  Employment  Equality  (Age)  Regulations  2006’  (July
2005) DTI, URN 05/1171, at para 6.1.15.)
Clearly one major concern is the consequences on pension schemes. As seen  above,  Article  6(2)
of the Directive has provided that the pension scheme, in itself, may  discriminate  on  grounds  of
age. This, unlike Article 6(1), does not require the derogation to be justified. So  claims  for  direct
or indirect age discrimination by the pension scheme are not possible. But Article  6(2)  cannot  be
used, in itself, to justify age-related dismissal, or retirement. So the issue remains that  the  default
retirement age must be justified, according to the  “legitimate  aim  by  appropriate  and  necessary
means” rubric, provided by Article 6(1).  What  follows  is  an  explanation  of  the  operation  and
coverage  of  occupational  pensions,  the  Canadian  experience,  and  the  likely  result  should   a
challenge be defended on the ground of preventing “adverse consequences”  on  pension  schemes
(the “occupational pensions” defence).
A. Occupational Pensions in The UK
There are two main types of occupational pension schemes: the defined benefit (DB)  scheme  and
the defined contribution  (DC)  scheme.  Although  there  are  a  number  of  hybrid  schemes  that
combine the features of both DB and DC schemes, DB schemes still  account  for  89  per  cent  of
scheme members (National Association of Pension Funds (2003) Annual  survey  of  occupational
pension schemes, NAPF, London).
With a DB scheme, it is the pension benefit that is defined. In the UK most DB schemes  are  known  as  occupational
final salary schemes, since the pension is some proportion of final salary, where the proportion  depends  on  years  of
service. A typical scheme in the UK has a benefit formula of one-sixtieth of final salary for each year of service up  to
a maximum of 40 years’ service, implying a maximum pension of two-thirds of final salary, with the pension  indexed
to inflation to a maximum of 5% per annum. In the public sector one eightieth is more common, but  members  accrue
a lump-sum benefit in addition to their pension, so that the  overall  rates  of  accrual  are  similar.  In  addition  to  the
pension most final salary schemes provide extra benefits, for example, death-in-service and early retirement benefits.
In a DC scheme, what is defined is the contribution rate into the fund, for example, 10% of earnings, and the resulting
pension depends solely on the size of the fund accumulated at retirement.  Such  schemes  are  also  known  as  money
purchase schemes and in the UK they are better known as personal pension schemes. The accumulated  fund  must  be
used to buy a life annuity from an insurance company, although up to 25 per cent of the fund can  be  taken  as  a  tax-
free lump sum on the retirement date. In 1995, as a result of falling interest  rates,  the  UK  government  was  pressed
into allowing income drawdown (meaning you can take certain amounts from your pension  between  the  ages  of  50
and 75): it became  possible  to  delay  the  purchase  of  an  annuity  until  annuity  rates  improved  (or  until  age  75
whichever was sooner).
Usually employees are expected  to  contribute  about  5  per  cent  of  pay  to  a  DB  occupational  scheme  while  the
employer meets the “balance of the cost”. In 2002, employers on average contributed about 12 per cent of pay  to  DB
schemes (National Association of Pension Funds  (2003)  Annual  survey  of  occupational  pension  schemes,  NAPF,
London). In theory, the employer has an open-ended commitment to the pension scheme.  The  financially  significant
risks are from lower than expected investment returns and increasing longevity. An  employer  might  be  expected  to
make additional contributions to meet any shortfall in assets relative to liabilities.  To  a  certain  extent  the  employer
can control this cost either by limiting salary growth or by closing the scheme.  Since  2003,  solvent  employers  have
been obliged to pay to buy out defined benefit liabilities if  they  wind  up  a  scheme,  making  it  unlikely  that  many
employers would pursue this course lightly.
During the 1950s and most of the 1960s the number of people in occupational pension schemes grew rapidly to  reach
about half the number of employees in employment, at which level it has broadly remained (see Figure  1).  Since  the
early 1990s no company has set up a DB scheme and an increasing number of companies are closing DB  schemes  to
new employees in favour of DC schemes (The Economist (2002) “End of the party”, 2 March, p 37). In so far  as  DB
schemes  constitute  all  public  sector  pension  schemes  and  all  large   and   very   large   schemes   in   the   private
sector (GAD (2005) Occupational pension schemes 2004 – The twelfth survey by  the  Government
Actuary, London: The Government Actuary’s Department)  their  closure  is  having  a  downward
impact on the number of active members of occupational pension  schemes  in  the  private  sector
(Figure 1). Furthermore, where DB schemes are offered by employers their membership cannot be
made a condition of employment. (Membership could be made a  condition  of  employment  until
1987, when compulsory membership was prohibited under the 1986 Social Security Act.)
Figure 1 Number of active members of occupational pension schemes
Source: Eleventh survey by the Government Actuary Department 2003
Current coverage of pension schemes is not universal, and decreases further down the income  distribution  scales.  As
shown in Figure 2, of those earning between £25,000-39,000 only 28 per cent have no private pension  coverage;  this
increases to 72 per cent of those earning less than £9,000. Put another way, those with higher earnings are much more
likely to be members of an occupational pension  scheme  with  82.1  per  cent  of  those  in  the  highest  earning,  ten
percent of the population, having either an occupational pension scheme or an  occupational  pension  and  a  personal
pension. (Disney, R. and Emmerson, C. (2002)  ‘Choice  of  pension  schemes  and  job  mobility  in
Britain’, London: Institute of Fiscal Studies.)
Figure 2: Participation in  private  sector  employer-sponsored  schemes,  by  earnings  band
(2003)
Source:  Turner  (2004)  Pensions:  Challenges  and  choices  –  The  first  report  of  the  Pensions
Commission
Pension coverage is traditionally highest among men who work full-time as shown  in  Figure  3.  Between  1983  and
2002 there was an 11 per cent drop in  the  percentage  of  full-time  men  who  are  members  of  employers’  pension
schemes. The trend in proportions of women employees who are members of employers’  pension  schemes  has  been
changing since 2000 with women who work  full  time  having  a  high  propensity  of  belonging  to  an  occupational
pension scheme. Women working part-time, however, still have the lowest coverage.
Figure 3: Percentage of employees that are members of current employer’s pension  scheme,
by sex and full-time/part-time status
Source: Pensions Commission (2004) Pensions: Challenges and choices – The  first  report  of  the
Pensions Commission
Amongst ethnic minority groups, both men and women are less likely  to  have  private  pension  coverage  than  their
white counterparts. The extent of the difference is most  marked  for  Pakistanis  and  Bangladeshis.  (Ginn,  J.  and
Arber,  S.  (2001),  Pension  prospects  of  minority  ethnic  groups:  inequalities  by   gender   and
ethnicity, British Journal of Sociology, No. 52, Issue No. 3, pp. 519-539.)
The pension commission report attributes  this  to  economic  inactivity  rates  of  the  two  groups,
higher unemployment and self-employment rates particularly amongst Pakistanis, and  patterns  of
employment of Bangladeshis. (Pensions Commission (2004) Pensions:  challenges  and  choices  -
the  first  report  of  the  pensions  commission,  TSO,  London.  No  general  table   available   for
breakdown.) Therefore occupational pension membership is not inclusive of all employees and the
data presented in Figure 3 is not representative of  the  whole  working  population,  in  1995  only
46%  of  the  working   population   were   members   of   occupational   pensions.   (GAD   (2001)
‘Occupational Pension Schemes 1995, Tenth Survey by the Government  Actuary’,  London:  The
Government Actuary’s Department.)
B. Occupational  Pensions and the Canadian Experience
The Government may take some encouragement from a decision of the Canadian Supreme  Court,
where the total exclusion of those over 65 from age discrimination protection within  section  9(a)
of the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981,  was  unsuccessfully  challenged  as  being  contrary  to
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In McKinney  v  University  of  Guelph  [1990]  3  SCR
229, several university academics claimed  that  inter  alia,  section  9(a),  Ontario  Human  Rights
Code  1981,  which  excluded  those  aged   over   65   from   protection   under   the   Code’s   age
discrimination law, violated the non-discrimination tenet in section 15(1) of the Charter of  Rights
and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of five-to-two,  rejected  their  claim,
principally on the basis that a general retirement age of 65 was necessary to preserve  the  stability
and integrity of pension schemes. There are significant parallels between this case and a challenge
made to the UK Government’s default retirement age.
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
“Every individual is equal before and under the  law  and  has  the  right  to  the  equal  protection  and  equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national  or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”
Section 1(1) of the Charter provides that a discriminatory law may be justified:
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it  subject  only
to such reasonable limits  prescribed  by  law  as  can  be  demonstrably  justified  in  a  free  and  democratic
society.”
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test of justification, often referred to as “the  Oakes  test”,  following  its
inception in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. In Andrews v Law Society of  British  Columbia  [1989]  1
SCR 143, the Court expressed it thus (at 153-155):
“The first hurdle to be crossed in order to override a right guaranteed in the Charter is  that
the objective sought to be achieved by the impugned law must relate to concerns which are
‘pressing and substantial’ in a free and democratic society.
Second, the means chosen to attain those objectives must be  proportional  or  appropriate  to  the  ends.  The
proportionality requirement, in turn, normally has  three  aspects:  the  limiting  measures  must  be  carefully
designed, or rationally connected, to the objective; they must impair the right as little  as  possible;  and  their
effects  must  not  so  severely  trench  on  individual  or  group  rights  that  the  legislative  objective,  albeit
important, is nevertheless outweighed by the abridgment of rights.” (Citing  R  v  Edwards  Books  and
Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713, at 768.)
This  roughly  equates  to  the  Directive  formula.  The  first  part  compares  to  the  “legitimate   aim”.   The   second
“proportionality”  part,  encompasses  the  appropriate  means  (“rationally  connected”)   and   the   necessary   means
(“minimal impairment”), whilst in addition, it requires the defendant to weigh the objective against the discriminatory
effect of the measure.
In general, the Supreme Court’s majority decision rested largely on evidence of  the  adverse  effect  on  the  “stability
and integrity” ([1990] 3 SCR 229, at 303 and 304)  of  pension  schemes,  should  employers  be  forced  to  abolish  a
mandatory retirement age (“MRA”). Should a legal challenge be made against the default retirement age,  it  is  likely,
especially in light of  the  Government’s  December  14  parliamentary  statement,  (see  above,  ‘3.  DEFAULT
RETIREMENT AGE’) that similar arguments would be aired. It is perhaps surprising  that  from
at least a dozen affidavits of expert testimony, only two specifically addressed the pensions  issue.
The first, on behalf of the defendants, by  Gunderson  and  Pesando  (affidavit  of  Gunderson,  M,
Case on Appeal, Vol 12, para 42) was favoured by the Court: La Forest,  J  stated  ([1990]  3  SCR
229, at 307):
“In the view of these scholars, the repercussions of abolishing  mandatory  retirement  would  be  felt  ‘in  all
dimensions  of  the  personnel   function:   hiring,   training,   dismissals,   monitoring   and   evaluation,   and
compensation’. These authors observed:
‘In short, a number of issues regarding the design of occupational pension plans would have to be  addressed
if mandatory retirement were not permitted. So, too, would the wage  policy  followed  by  many  employers,
especially when the  pension  benefit  is  linked  to  the  employee’s  earnings.  The  use  of  the  occupational
pension plan as a vehicle for deferring a portion of  the  employee’s  total  compensation  to  the  employee’s
later work  years  may  be  reduced.  As  before,  not  permitting  mandatory  retirement  is  likely  to  require
compensating adjustments elsewhere in the compensation package and in the set of  work  rules  that  govern
the workplace.’
In  tinkering  with  mandatory  retirement,  we  are  affecting  an  institution  closely  intertwined  with  other
organizing rules of the workplace.”
The plaintiff’s expert confined his evidence to effect upon pension plans of removing  the  MRA.  He  highlighted  the
experiences of Quebec and Manitoba, where the MRA was removed and no “instability” was apparent in  the  pension
plans  as  a  result.  He  testified  that  deferred  retirement  would  invoke  some   administrative   costs   for   actuarial
adjustments,  which  would  “pale  into  insignificance  compared  to  administrative   costs   resulting   from   pension
legislation.” Second, he noted that the removal of the MRA did not necessarily  alter  the  normal  retiring  age  in  the
pension plan. In Quebec and Manitoba, for example, legislation requires that a normal retiring age  be  stated
in the pension plan. (Affidavit of Peter C. Hirst, Case on Appeal  Vol 7, Tab 2,  respectively  paras
11 and 14.)
Before applying the justification test, the majority noted that age differed from other grounds of discrimination.  First,
because “There is a general relationship between  advancing  age  and  declining  ability”  Second,  discrimination  on
other grounds is “generally based on feelings of hostility and intolerance.” This should “neutralise”  any  suspicion  of
laws that discriminate on the ground of age ([1990] 3 SCR 229, at 297). This is demonstrated in case law.  In  Law  v
Minister of Pensions [1999] 1 SCR 497, a state pension scheme that reduced payments to  widows
under 45 years of age  was  held  not  even  to  infringe  section  15  of  the  Charter,  because  this
difference in treatment on the ground of  age  did  not  violate  “the  essential  human  dignity  and
freedom” of the claimant (para 106). Contrast Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia  [1989]
SCR 143, where a citizenship requirement to practise law could not be justified under section 1  of
the Charter, because it was “not carefully tailored to achieve that objective and  may  not  even  be
rationally  connected  to  it”;  it  could  be  better  achieved  by  an  examination  of  the  particular
qualifications of  the  applicant  (at  156).  Similarly,  the  US  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  age
discrimination does not warrant heightened (as for race) or intermediate  (sex)  scrutiny  under  the
Constitutional  principle  of  equal  protection  of  the   laws,   because,   older   people   have   not
experienced a “history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique disabilities  on
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.” Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US  307,  at  313  (Sup  Ct  1976)).   In  any  case,  the  comments  in
McKinney set the tone for the scrutiny, suggesting that it would  be  less  stringent  than  for  other
grounds of discrimination.
The majority considered that the main objective was the “integrity” of  the  pensions  system,  additionally  noting  the
importance of the freedom of employers and workers to contract for a MRA, and the concerns of workers who wished
to  take  advantage  of  the  normal  retiring  age  and  accompanying  benefits.  These  were  pressing  and  substantial
objectives, whilst The object of reducing Canada’s  youth  unemployment  “should  not  be  accorded  much  weight.”
([1990] 3 SCR 229, at 302.)
The majority, without lengthy explanation,  found  that  the  legislation  “obviously  achieves”  the
main objective (of “stability in pension arrangements”) and was therefore rationally  connected  to
that goal.
On the second, “minimal impairment” point, the majority noted the “permissive” nature of  section  9(a);  the  Ontario
Legislature is “not imposing its will in the  area”  of  mandatory  retirement,  which  is  negotiated  by  employers  and
workers in the private sector. Indeed the Canadian labour movement favoured a mandatory  retirement  age  of  65  (at
312-313).
The majority were, on this point, heavily influenced by the evidence of Gunderson (above) that stated that if the MRA
were removed a whole raft of established employment practices would  unravel.  Such  decisions  over  this,  and  any
conflicting  economic  evidence,  should  be  left  to  the  Legislature  -  which  should   have   “reasonable   room   for
manoeuvre” (at 314-315) - and not the “heavy hand of the law.” (Per Sopinka, J, ibid, at 316.)
A second issue of minimal impairment raised was  that  section  9(a)  was  not  proportionate  (or  had  “overbreadth”)
because  it  removed  all  age  discrimination  rights  for  those  over  65,  and  thus  went  further   than
necessary merely to retain MRA. Workers kept on beyond 65, could suffer discrimination without
redress. The majority was dismissive of this, calling the argument “a fussy  concern”,  although  it
noted  that  age  related  harassment  was  covered  by  a  general  provision   against   harassment.
Otherwise the argument was “fanciful.” (At 315-316.)
On the third,  “Objective v Abridgement of Rights” point, the majority noted that section 15(2)  of
the Charter allowed for  positive  discrimination  in  certain  circumstances  (which  disadvantages
certain groups to achieve a goal), so section 1 envisages some circumstances where certain groups
will be disadvantaged in pursuit of a greater goal (at 317). Finally, as  the  Charter  expressly  does
not apply to private matters, it would be wrong to allow it to operate through  the  “back  door”  to
bind private employers (at 318).
In  summary,  the  majority  allowed  the  legislature   “reasonable   room   for   manoeuvre”,   deferred   to   it   where
economic/expert evidence clashed, and was highly influenced by Gunderson’s evidence of the interconnection  of  the
MRA with pensions and other established employment practices.
As noted above, the general approach to age discrimination was less stringent than the Supreme Court would take  for
other grounds of discrimination. In particular, the Court gave the Legislature “room for manoeuvre,” which resembles
the “margin of appreciation” given by the European Court of  Human  Rights  to  defendant  states,  or  the  margin  of
discretion given by the  ECJ  to  Member  States  trying  to  justify  indirect  discrimination  (eg  Handyside  v
UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, and see  generally, O’Donnell, T, ‘The margin of  appreciation  doctrine:
standards in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1982) 4 Human Rights Q
474; Morrisson, CC ‘Margin of appreciation in human rights law’ (1973) 6 Human  Rights  J  263.
Note  that  this  discretion  “cannot  have  the   effect   of   frustrating   the   implementation   of   a
fundamental principle of Community law such as that of  equal  pay  for  men  and  women.”  R  v
Secretary of State for Employment ex p Seymour-Smith and Perez Case C-167-97 [1999] 2 CMLR
273, [2000] ICR 244, at para 75.)
However,  the  ECJ  affords  Member  States  no  such  margin  of  discretion  in  cases   of   direct
discrimination: any infringement must be  justified  within  specific  derogations  provided  in  the
relevant Directive. (Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary  Case  C-222/84
[1986]  ECR  1561,  [1987]  QB  129,  paras  53,  57  and  60;  Maria  Luisa   Jimenez   Melgar   v
Ayuntamiento  de  Los  Barrios  Case  C-438/99  2001  ECR   I-6915,   at   para   33.)   For   direct
discrimination,   these   are   usually   specific   job-related   exceptions,   where   the   ground    of
discrimination (eg sex or race) is a “genuine and determining occupational requirement”.  (See  eg
Race Directive 2000/43/EC, Art 4. Equal Treatment Directive, 76/207/EC, Art 2(6).)  In  addition,
the  exception  must  be  proportionate.  The  same  job-related  exception   is   available   for   age
discrimination by employers,  under  Article  4(1)  of  the  Framework  Directive.  Of  course,  this
cannot be used by a State to justify a default retirement age which will be applicable to all jobs, no
matter what the occupation. But the Directive does offer the State a  broad  scope  to  discriminate,
on the ground of age only, by Article 6, which represents  the  EU’s  “less  stringent”  approach  to
age discrimination seen in McKinney. Article 6 is non-specific, allowing age discrimination where
it can  be  justified  in  pursuit  of  a  “legitimate  aim”.  Some  examples  are  offered,  such  as  an
employment policy, but they are non-exhaustive. However, Article  6  also  contains  the  standard
proportionality  rubric,  and  the  difference  between  this  and  the   Canadian   Supreme   Court’s
approach is likely to be in the strictness of the application of the  “proportionality”  question.  ECJ
case law on discrimination suggests a very strict approach.
The first thing to note is that a default retirement age is a more refined exception than Ontario’s crude exclusion of all
age discrimination rights for those over 65. Under the Government’s proposal, workers over  65  will  still  be  able  to
claim for age discrimination, for say, discriminatory discipline, pay, harassment and job classification.  This  makes  it
easier to justify the measure.
However, whereas the majority in McKinney found this proportionality argument  “fanciful,”  ([1990]  3
SCR  229,  at  315-316)  they  failed  to  address  other  issues   of   proportionality.   Whilst   they
appreciated the freedom to contract for a MRA, a freedom supported by trade unions, they did  not
appreciate the workers who do not have occupational pensions, collective bargaining,  and  all  the
other benefits and practices noted.  Further,  it  is  probably  the  case  that  these  workers  are  the
poorest, being women in segregated occupations or immigrants (noted in the dissent of Wilson,  J,
at 415-416. The rights of those workers were subjugated for the benefit of those in far more secure
and better-paid employment.
The  objection  to  private  application  by  the  “back  door”  does  not  apply  in  Britain.   Unlike   the
Canadian Charter, the Directive, through each Member State, is intended to bind state and  private
employers to the equal treatment principle. Thus, no such argument should be presented here.
The Canadian Court showed a good deal of deference to the provincial legislature that  passed  the
disputed law, stepping back from what  it  saw  as  quasi-political  decision-making,  or  using  the
“heavy hand of the law”. Again, this contrasts with the position in the UK. Although the Directive
allows each Member State to achieve the goals of the Directive in its own way, any shortfall of the
Directive’s aims and principles in this transposition are treated seriously by the ECJ. For instance,
the original section 6(3) of the  Sex  Discrimination  Act  1975  provided  exceptions  in  all  cases
where the number of employees did not exceed five, and also where the employment  was  for  the
purposes  of  a  private  household.  These  exceptions  were  held  to  be  contrary   to   the   Equal
Treatment Directive (Commission of the European Communities v United  Kingdom  Case  165/82
[1984] ICR 192.) The ECJ reasoned that in small undertakings it was not always the case  that  the
sex of the worker would be an occupational determining factor, for the purposes of  the  exception
provided by Article 2(2) of the Directive. Similarly, the blanket exception for  private  households
was too general. The householder’s privacy should be just one factor in a decision. In other words,
section 6(3), was disproportionate. No deference was given to the UK parliament that  had  passed
the  Sex  Discrimination  Act  1975.  The  1986  Sex  Discrimination  Act  therefore  repealed   the
provisions held unlawful by the European Court and introduced a new s 7(2)(ba) to  the  1975  Act
which is couched in more restrictive terms.
For  two  reasons  the  ECJ  should  not  take  the  “less  stringent”  approach  to  age  discrimination  demonstrated  in
McKinney. First, leeway is already given by the special provision in Article 6.  This  indicates  that
the Directive itself has accounted for  any  distinctive  characteristics  of  age  discrimination.  The
leeway given by Article 6 does not signal that courts should adopt a less stringent  approach.  This
is because Article 6 is clearly defined. This is especially  so  with  article  6(1),  which  carries  the
standard formula for justification. Second, the ECJ has shown little  sympathy  for  benign-motive
discrimination (see eg Johnston v  Chief  Constable  of  the  Royal  Ulster  Constabulary  Case  C-
222/84  [1987]  QB  129,  especially  paras  53,  57  and  60;   Maria   Luisa   Jimenez   Melgar   v
Ayuntamiento  de  Los  Barrios  Case  C-438/99  2001  ECR  I-6915,  at  para  330),  whereas   the
majority in McKinney clearly took the view that as age discrimination was not “generally based on
feelings of hostility and intolerance,” they were entitled to adopt a less stringent approach (([1990]
3 SCR 229, at 297). This difference of approach can be explained, in part at least, by the  different
roles of the respective courts.  The  Canadian  Supreme  Court  was  acting  as  a  guardian  of  the
individuals’  constitutional  rights  against  the  state,  whereas  the  ECJ  will   be   overseeing   an
individual’s employment rights, which are more precisely defined. This was  demonstrated  in  the
first age discrimination case to reach the ECJ, Mangold v Helm Case C-144/04, [2006] IRLR 143.
Here, German law exempted from regulation  fixed-term  employment  contracts  for  any  worker
over 52. The purpose was to help unemployed older workers back to work. The ECJ held  that  the
German Government should have a “broad margin of discretion” to implement this  social  policy,
but as it was not tailored for those unemployed older workers it could not be  deemed  “necessary”
to achieve the goal. This shows that the ECJ will take the same approach to age  discrimination  as
it does to any other ground, and is in marked contrast to the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach
C. The “Occupational Pensions” Defence
Although the issues in  McKinney  resemble  a  challenge  to  a  default  retirement  age,  there  are
important differences. First, the ECJ will take a more  stringent  approach  to  justification  of  age
discrimination and will not show such  deference  to  the  UK  Parliament.  Second,  there  were  a
number of disproportionate features  to  the  Ontario  Human  Rights  Act’s  exception,  which  the
majority swept aside, or failed to consider at all. These factors would each  be  taken  seriously  by
the ECJ, as shown in Mangold. The only difference in the Government’s favour is that the  default
retirement age is more refined than the sweeping denial of all  age  discrimination  rights  to  those
over 65,  although,  as  we  shall  see,  this  does  not  prevent  the  default  retirement  age’s  other
disproportionate effects.
The impact of the age discrimination principle absent a default retirement age on pension schemes  generally  will  the
same with DC and DB pensions (see above ‘A. Occupational  Pensions  in  The  UK’).  It  is  anticipated
that the normal retirement age  (NRA)  of  pension  schemes  will  rise  to  65  based  on  evidence
presented by the Government Actuary  Department  indicating  an  increase  in  pension  schemes’
NRA since  1985.  (GAD  (2001)  ‘Occupational  Pension  Schemes  1995,  Tenth  Survey  by  the
Government Actuary’, London: The Government Actuary’s Department.) Pension schemes with a
NRA of 65 or above are more cost effective for employers  and  therefore  more  sustainable.  And
new Inland Revenue proposals allow employees to carry on working for  their  employers  beyond
the NRA of both DB and DC pension schemes.
The are two possibilities. Some workers will draw their pension at the  scheme’s  NRA  and  carry  on  working.  This
option will have no more impact than the worker who simply retires and  draws  the  pension.  Other  employees  may
work beyond 65 and defer drawing their pension until they wish, simply providing more  years’  contribution.  Here  a
scheme’s stability is not affected because individuals will be contributing for longer and drawing their pensions  for  a
shorter number of years.
However, there is a negative effect of the default retirement age on minorities  and  women.  Membership  of  pension
schemes is skewed towards male workers on above-average income. Employees of low income, ethnic minorities and,
to  a  lesser  degree,  women  are  less  likely  to  be  in  occupational  pensions  (see  Figure  3,  above).  This  pension
disadvantage implies dependence on means-tested benefits and poverty in later life  especially  as  government  policy
shifts  towards  private  sector  pension  provision.  (Ginn,  J.  and  Arber,  S.  (2001)  Pension  prospects  of
minority ethnic groups: inequalities by gender and ethnicity, British Journal of Sociology, No.  52,
Issue No. 3, pp. 519-539.)
Age  discrimination  legislation  without   the   default   retirement   age   entitles   this   category   of
employee to remain in the labour market, in order to boost a low  income.  The  default  retirement
age disentitles them from doing this.
This evidence shows that the default retirement age is not an appropriate  method  to  preserve  the
stability of pension schemes because the  age  legislation  absent  the  default  retirement  age  will
have  no adverse effects on DC or DB pensions schemes, whether drawn or deferred. Further, it  is
a disproportionate method because a  significant  proportion  of  workers  affected  by  the  default
retirement  age  do  not  have  occupational  pensions,  and  yet  have  their  discrimination   rights
removed for the benefit of others. This  is  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  this  category  contains  a
disproportionate amount of the low-paid, ethnic minorities, and (to a lesser degree)  women.  Thus
the default retirement age struggles to look like an appropriate or necessary  means  of  preserving
the stability of occupational pensions.
Should the default retirement age prove unlawful,  retiring  workers  at  65,  without  more,  is  age
discrimination. This brings it into  the  same  class  as  any  mandatory  retirement  age  below  65,
which the employer must objectively justify.
5. JUSTIFYING RETIREMENT UNDER 65
Article 6(1) (set out above), permits Member States to legislate for a “legitimate aim”  including  employment
policy and labour market objectives. Regulation 3 of the Age Regulations 2006 defines direct  and
indirect age discrimination and carries a common defence of objective  justification.  Thus,  unlike
other grounds of discrimination (sex, race, etc),  direct  age  discrimination  can  be  justified.  The
employer must show that the  treatment  was  a  “proportionate  means  of  achieving  a  legitimate
aim.”
Thus it is theoretically possible for an employer  to  insist  upon  a  mandatory  retirement  age  for
reasons associated with  its  occupational  pension  scheme.  However,  this  is  rather  fanciful,  as
standard  actuarial  opinion  would  favour  an  increase  in  retirement  age  on  grounds  of  fiscal
prudence, because workers generally  would  be  drawing  pensions  for  a  shorter  number  years.
Thus, employers providing pension schemes  with  NRAs  of  below  65  will  suffer  no  financial
consequences if their employees express a desire to work beyond the NRA.
6. CONCLUSION
A nationwide default retirement age  clearly  is  a  major  inroad  into  the  age  anti-discrimination
principle. It need not breach the non-regression principle of the parent Directive, but the  Directive
affords Member States no blanket power to introduce such a major exception.  Instead  it  must  be
objectively justified in the normal way. Unlike the Canadian Supreme  Court,  the  ECJ  will  treat
this question with the same rigour as other grounds of discrimination, such as sex. Contrary to  the
Government’s view, the evidence is that if the age legislation were  introduced  without  a  default
retirement age it would have no adverse consequences for occupational pension schemes.  Further,
the default retirement age has a disproportionate effect  on  those  without  occupational  pensions,
who tend to be  the  low  paid,  women  in  part-time  work,  and  ethnic  minorities.  As  such,  the
“occupational pensions” defence is unlikely to justify the default retirement age.
------------------------------------
[i] ‘Member States may  provide  that  the  following  differences  in  particular  do  not  constitute
discrimination: (a) the  implementation  of  special  conditions  regarding  access  to  employment,
employment  or  working  conditions,  including  dismissal  and  pay,  or  vocational  training   for
younger people, (...) older workers or those with caring responsibilities in order  to  facilitate  their
professional integration or to ensure their protection; (b) the fixing for occupational social security
schemes of ages for admission or entitlement to  retirement  or  invalidity  benefits,  including  the
fixing of different ages for employees or groups of  categories  of  employees  under  occupational
social security schemes on grounds of physical or mental occupational requirements, and  the  use,
in the scope of such schemes, of age criteria in actuarial calculations, provided this does not  result
in discrimination on the grounds of sex; (c) the fixing of (...) appropriate conditions regarding age,
professional experience or seniority in the job, to take  up  a  post  or  benefit  from  (...)  particular
advantages related to a post; (d) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment  which  is  based  on
the  training  requirements  of  the  post  in  question  or  the  need   for   a   reasonable   period   of
employment before retirement; (e) the implementation of special conditions to  ensure  a  balanced
age structure in an organisation, or to ensure a smooth transition from working life  to  retirement;
(f) the fixing  of  retirement  ages  and  of  employment  rights  linked  to  such  ages  and  benefits
calculated by reference to those ages.’
